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1 Introduction
Is there any diversification logic driving international portfolio choice? French and Poterba [1991],
documenting the existence of a “home bias in portfolio”, clearly pointed at a failure of this logic:
due to the variance-covariance structure of home and foreign returns, investors would typically
benefit from holding more assets abroad. But one can ask further: is the part of investors portfolios
held abroad properly diversified? In particular, given that, for any reason that be, investors are
over-exposed on their domestic assets (the home bias in portfolio), they should want to tilt their
international holdings towards countries that provide a good hedge for their domestic risk, i.e.
countries whose stock market indices have little correlation with their home stock index. Do
they? The goal of this paper is to address this question, focusing on aggregate equity holdings.
Recently, following Portes and Rey [2005], a couple of papers in international finance have
looked at the determinants of international asset flows and holdings (Aviat and Coeurdacier [2004],
Lane and Milesi-Feretti [2004]). These papers typically adopt a methodology imported from the
empirical trade literature and run regressions of the following form:
log(assetij) = α+ β logmi + γ logmj + δZij + εij (1)
where assetij is the amount of assets held by country i in country j, mi and mj proxy for the
market size of each country and Zij is a set of variables aﬀecting bilateral asset holdings. Though
such “gravity” equations are not strongly grounded in theory (except for the notable exception
of Martin and Rey [2004]), they have proved to perform very well empirically: the elasticity
of bilateral asset holdings to the market size of both source and target country is close to one,
and variables capturing transaction costs and information asymetries have a significant negative
impact.
Throughout the paper, we adopt this gravity equation framework and focus on the impact of
bilateral stock return correlations on bilateral equity holdings. Theory tells us that we should
1
expect a negative relationship. Running a naive regression without controlling for geography and
trade, we find a positive impact of bilateral stock returns correlations on bilateral equity holdings.
We confidently interpret this result as spurious, capturing the common impact of geography and
trade on equity holdings and on return correlations. Indeed: a) Frankel and Rose [1998] and Imbs
[1999] show that trading partners have more correlated business cycles (and Walti [2004] shows
they also have more correlated stock returns) while Flavin et al. [2001] show that closer countries
have more stock markets comovements; and b) the fact that countries foreign holdings are biased
towards geographically close economies and trading partners is the main conclusion of Portes and
Rey [2005], Aviat and Coeurdacier [2004] and Lane and Milesi-Feretti [2004]. But this is not the
end of the story: when we control for trade and distance, foreign portfolio holdings still appear to
be biased towards countries whose assets are the closest substitutes to the domestic ones1 .
Does the positive correlation found in the data at this stage implies rejection of the traditional
model of rational portfolio choice? We argue that before to jump to that conclusion, one should
make sure that the degree of “financial integration” has been properly controlled for. In our words,
the degree of financial integration between countries i and j refers to the relative easiness with
which an investor from country i can invest in country j. This depends on many factors — infor-
mational asymetries, transaction costs, fiscal hindrances, familiarity, etc... Saying that (bilateral)
foreign investment is positively aﬀected by (bilateral) financial integration is stating the obvious.
But returns correlation is also endogenous: for a given correlation of the economic fundamentals,
returns correlation increases with the degree of integration. This is because prices comovements
are partly induced by portfolio rebalancing between markets (Coeurdacier and Guibaud [2004]
make this point in a dynamic equilibrium model). In the context of our empirical investigation,
this means that the positive sign reported for the correlation coeﬃcient could result from a pos-
itive bias on the OLS estimator due to the endogeneity of the observed level of stock market
1 It is true though that, when we control for these variables, the positive impact of stock market correlation is
very much reduced.
2
correlations.
In order to overcome the suspected endogeneity bias, we had to find an appropriate instru-
mentation scheme. Our strategy consists in taking bilateral stock market correlations over the
period 1950-1975 to instrument current stock return correlations. We argue that this constitutes
a good instrument since until the mid 1970’s most stock markets were segmented (Obstfeld and
Taylor [2000], Kaminsky and Schmuckler [2003]), so that the observed correlation over this period,
reflecting only the fundamental correlation, is related to current correlation but not to the current
degree of financial integration between countries. Indeed, when we run instrumented regression,
we recover asset demand functions that decrease with the correlation. Ceteris paribus (i.e. con-
trolling for all the obstacles to cross-border investment), a high correlation with the domestic
stock market deters investment.
Hence, the message of this paper is that the basic principles of portfolio theory are not com-
pletely ignored. This bottom line stands in contrast to a strand of the literature that has come to
conclude, as Huberman [2001] puts it, that “People invest in the familiar while often ignoring the
principles of portfolio theory”. Though a behavioral approach to investment practices is certainly
relevant, traditional portfolio theory should not be completely discarded as a positive theory.
For the remaining of the paper, our roadmap is the following. In section 2, we sketch a model
of international portfolio choice featuring home bias in portfolios (taking it as given). We make
it clear that, in a world without frictions generating “home bias”, there would be no systematic
relationship between cross-border holdings and returns correlation. However, we show that as
soon as we assume some home bias in portfolios, an increase in the correlation between country
j assets and domestic assets reduces holdings of country j assets by domestic investors. To
test this theoretical prediction, we adopt the same “gravity equation” framework as in Portes
and Rey [2005], Aviat and Coeurdacier [2004] and Lane and Milesi-Feretti [2004], using data on
bilateral equity holdings. In section 3, we document the “correlation puzzle” and we confirm some
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previous results on the geographical determinants of portfolio allocation. In section 4, we tackle
the endogeneity issue and show that the “correlation puzzle” vanishes when we instrument present
correlation with past correlation. Section 5 concludes.
2 A simple problem of portfolio choice
In this section, we solve the portfolio choice problem of an international investor whose equity
portfolio is biased towards domestic assets for exogenous reasons (regulations, transaction or
information costs on foreign investment, existence of non-tradable goods...). We show that, under
this realistic “home-bias assumption”, assets that are highly correlated with the domestic asset
are less attractive. The logic of this result is that, being over-exposed on their domestic risk,
investors want to hedge this risk by holding assets that have low correlation with their domestic
asset.
2.1 Assumptions
The world is composed of N + 1 countries. We consider the portfolio choice problem of a “mean-
variance” representative investor of country H (the problem is symmetric for investors of other
countries) endowed with wealth WH and facing the following menu of assets :
• A risk-free asset with constant return r.
• N foreign assets (to be understood as risky constant return production technologies). We
note Rj the excess expected return of asset j, 1 ≤ j ≤ N , over the risk-free rate, RF the
N-dimensional vector of excess expected returns, and ΩF the variance-covariance matrix of
those assets.
• A home asset with excess expected return RH and variance σ2H . We note ωj the covariance of
the home asset with the foreign asset j and ω the covariance vector (and ωT its transposed).
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We note Ω the variance-covariance matrix of the whole set of (home and foreign) risky assets :
Ω =


σ2H ωT
ω ΩF

 (2)
We will note αH the share of wealth invested in the home asset, αj the share invested in the
foreign asset j and αF the N-by-1 vector of αj ’s. The share of wealth invested in the riskless asset
is equal to 1− αH −
PN
j=1 αj .
Home-bias assumption: we need to introduce some home-bias in this standard static model.
To do so, we use a short-cut and assume that the share of wealth invested in domestic assets has
to be above a certain level2 αH . We assume that this constraint will be binding3 , so that:
αH = αH . (3)
2.2 Benchmark case: asset allocations without frictions
To start with, we consider the case without frictions on international capital markets. The un-
constrained optimization problem of country H investor is
max
{αH ,αF}
αHRH +αTFRF + r

1− αH −
NX
j=1
αj

− γ
2
µ
αH αTF
¶
Ω


αH
αF

 (4)
where γ is the coeﬃcient of risk aversion. The portfolio shares solution of this problem are given
by 

α0H
α0F

 =
1
γ
Ω−1


RH
RF

 (5)
where the superscript 0 denotes the absence of frictions.
2 In some countries there is indeed a maximum authorized threshold for the share of wealth invested in foreign
securities.
3 In the symmetric case where all assets have the same risk-return profile and are uncorrelated, it is suﬃcient
that αH > 1N+1 , which seems a reasonable assumption.
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Absent frictions, there is no heterogeneity among investors and they all hold the same portfolio.
Then, introducing α0ij the share of country i investor’s wealth invested in country j, m0j the overall
“market capitalization” of country j and W the aggregate wealth of the world, we can trivially
write:
∀i, α0ij =
m0j
W
(6)
If we introduce e0ij = α0ijWi the total amount invested by agent i in country j, we get:
log(e0ij) = log(Wi) + log(m0j)− log(W ) (7)
This equation can be seen as a “benchmark gravity equation” where the mass terms log(Wi) and
log(m0j) fully explain the bilateral asset holdings (to a constant): asset holdings of country i in
country j are fully determined by the wealth of agent i and the size of market j.
2.3 Asset allocations with frictions generating home bias
We now tackle the case where portfolios are biased towards domestic assets for exogenous reasons,
with αH = αH . In this case, the portfolio choice problem amounts to the following quadratic
maximization problem :
max
αF
αTFRF −
γ
2
£
2αHαTFω +αTFΩFαF
¤
(8)
From the first-order conditions, the optimal choice of foreign equities is given by
αF = Ω−1F
·
1
γ
RF − αHω
¸
(9)
The “home bias assumption” induces a hedging motive in foreign assets demand, which shows
up in the second term (in ω). As stated in proposition 1 below, when portfolios are biased towards
domestic securities, foreign assets that are close substitutes to the domestic ones are less attractive.
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Proposition 1: ∀ ΩF ∈ RN∗N ,
∂αj
∂ωj
= −
¡
Ω−1F
¢
jj αH < 0 (10)
with
¡
Ω−1F
¢
jj the j
th coeﬃcient on the diagonal of the inverse of ΩF.
Proof : as a variance-covariance matrixΩF is symmetric positive. ThenΩ−1F is also symmetric
positive, which implies:
¡
Ω−1F
¢
jj > 0
4 .
The following proposition further characterizes the outcome of the case with frictions, putting
emphasis on the way it deviates from the benchmark case without frictions. The constrained
foreign portfolio shares are written as the sum of two terms: the world market portfolio shares in
the frictionless case α0F, and a “hedging component” due to the home bias.
Proposition 2: Constrained foreign equity holdings are :
αF = α0F − (αH − α0H)Ω−1F ω = α
0
F −∆HF (11)
where α0F is the equilibrium vector of foreign portfolio share in absence of home bias and
∆HF ≡ (αH − α0H)Ω−1F ω.
Proof : in the appendix.
Proposition 2 will help us making sense of the empirical framework that we use in the next
section.
3 The “correlation puzzle”
3.1 Empirical methodology
In what follows, we use gravity equations to model bilateral cross-border asset holdings. Portes
and Rey [2005], Aviat and Coeurdacier [2004] and Lane and Milesi-Feretti [2004] have shown
4 Notice that proposition 1 also holds in terms of the correlation of asset j with the domestic asset (ρj):
∂αj/∂ρj < 0.
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that bilateral asset holdings are well explained by market sizes, financial market development and
variables that proxy for informational and transaction costs between countries (where geographical
distance and bilateral trade play a major role). We propose to estimate the following equation :
log(eij) = α+ β log(mimj) + γρij + δZij + εij (12)
where eij represents equity stocks of country j held by investors of country i, mi is the stock
market capitalization of country i, ρij is the correlation of stock returns expressed in US dollars
(USD) and Zij is a set of control variables (including trade and distance) that might aﬀect bilateral
equity holdings between the two markets.
Our theoretical detour in section 2 can shed light on our regression specification5 . From (6)
and (11), we can write αij the share of wealth of country i invested in country j as follows:
αij =
m0j
W
−∆ij =
m0j
W
(1− δij) (13)
where δij captures the deviation from the frictionless world market portfolio and is increasing in
ρij the correlation between country i and country j assets. Given that αij = eij/Wi, we get the
following “gravity equation” for international asset holdings, which extends (7) :
log(eij) = λ+ log(Wi) + log(m0j ) + log(1− δij) (14)
It can be seen that our specification (12) is not rigorously the counterpart of (14): we use the
stock market capitalization of country i as a proxy for its wealth Wi, and we use the observed
market capitalization instead ofm0j (the market capitalization in the hypothetical frictionless case)
since the latter is unobservable. Nonetheless, the theoretical insight contained in (14) leads us to
expect β to be close to one and γ to be negative, capturing the hedging motive induced by the
existence of impediments to investing abroad. As we saw, the latter prediction depends crucially
on the fact that markets are imperfectly integrated.
5 For another theoretical foundation of gravity equations for international trade in assets, see Martin and Rey
[2000].
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3.2 Data presentation
Our dataset is for the year 2001 and our sample contains 28 “source” countries and 41 “destination”
countries6 (the country list as well as further details on data sources are in the appendix). Data
on cross-border equity holdings (in USD) come from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey
provided by the IMF7 . To proxy for market sizes (the mass term log(mimj) in (12)), we use the
log of the product of “source” and “destination” countries market capitalizations (MarketCapij).
To control for financial development of both “source” and “destination” countries, we use the log
of the product of GDP per capita (GDP-CAPij). For each country, we construct monthly stock
market series in US $ from the main stock index for the period 1990-2001. For each country pairs,
we compute the stock returns correlation over this period (Correlationij) and for each destination
country, we take the average stock return (Returnj) as a proxy for expected return8 .
We add a set of control variables, whose role as key determinants of bilateral asset holdings has
been established in previous studies9 . We consider two geographical control variables : distij is
the distance (in log) between the two main cities and Borderij is a dummy variable for a common
border between country i and j10 . To control for bilateral trade flows, we use data from the
CHELEM database (CEPII, Paris) for the year 2001. Tradeij is the log of imports plus exports
between country j and country i divided by the product of countries GDP, reflecting trade rela-
tionships between countries that are not induced by countries sizes11 . We add a dummy variable
for currency unions (CurrencyUnionij) as these probably foster trade in assets by eliminating
6 We restricted our sample according to missing values and data availability for historical stock index series.
7 The CPIS reports some zero for very small amounts. We report 0.01 million USD instead of zero except in
the Tobit regression.
8 We compute the averaged annual return over the period 1990-2000. We drop the period August 1997 - August
1998 for Asian countries as realized stock returns in this crisis period would probably give a poor idea of expected
returns in this area.
9 Our estimates for the impact of these variables are consistent with previous studies.
10 We first added a “Time Diﬀerence” variable to control for diﬀerences in working hours on stock markets but
we dropped it because it did not modify any of the results and did not show up robustly.
11 We also tried other measures of trade intensity as the one proposed by Frankel (log
Expij+Impij
GDPi+GDPj
) or directed
trade using only imports or exports but it did not aﬀect our results.
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exchange rate uncertainty. To take into account the informational determinants of portfolio allo-
cation, we use a “Common Language” dummy (Languageij) if country i and country j share the
same language and a “Colonial Link” dummy (ColonialLinkij) if country j is a former colony of
country i or vice versa.
To control for fiscal and legal determinants of transaction costs in financial markets, we first use
a dummy for the proximity of legal systems from La Porta et al. [1997, 1998]. We distinguish be-
tween “common law” systems (or “English law”), “French law”, “German law” and “Swedish law”.
The dummy variable LegalSystemij equals one when source and destination countries have the
same legal system. Legal system similarities might reduce information asymmetries and contract-
ing costs. We also use bilateral tax treaties to describe the taxation of foreign capital. Although
most of the countries we study have a residence-based tax system, they charge withholding taxes
when foreigners repatriate dividends, capital gains or interests. To limit double—taxation, several
bilateral tax treaties regulate those withholding taxes. FiscalTreatyij is equal to one when such
a treaty exists. Finally, to control for unobservable regional variables that might aﬀect bilateral
equity holdings, we add some regional dummies in the “destination country” dimension. We have
five such dummies: Europe, North America, Central and South America, Africa, and Asia and
Oceania.
3.3 Estimation
Table (1) below presents our regression results. Two main results stand out: β is found to be close
to one as expected, but contrary to what theory predicts, γ is found robustly positive — which
constitutes a “correlation puzzle”.
When we do not include any control variable in the “gravity equation” (regression (1)), we
find that investors have equity portfolios that are very strongly biased towards countries whose
stock market indices are most correlated with their own stock index, completely at odds with the
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diversification logic that should drive portfolio choice. However, this regression might be largely
biased because of omitted variables that aﬀect simultaneously bilateral equity holdings and the
correlation of returns: the “correlation puzzle” might just be the result of a misspecification and
finding the right control variable could be a way to get rid of the puzzle. Trade, geogaphy and
financial development are candidate control variables. Indeed, Flavin et al. [2001] and Walti [2004]
respectively find that distance and bilateral trade are important determinants of stock market
comovements: stock market synchronization is higher between trading partners and lower between
distant economies. And it is also natural to think that deeper markets (developed economies)
show higher stock market comovements. At the same time, we know that equity stocks are biased
towards trading partners, close economies and deep markets. In regressions (2) and (3), we control
for these variables: though the puzzle has been very much reduced (the point estimate of the
correlation coeﬃcient has been divided by three) it remains with a very high level of significance.
It should be noted that almost all additional variables are significant with the expected sign, which
shows the robustness of previous empirical works on the determinants of bilateral asset holdings.
These results are not aﬀected in regression (4), where we control for source country fixed-eﬀect
(FE) by estimating the following regression:
log(eij) = αi + β log(mj) + γρij + δZij + εij (15)
This specification allows us to control for discrepancies between source-country wealth (the rel-
evant variable in theory) and market capitalization (the proxy we use). In regression (5), we
run a Tobit regression, as our variable Equityij is left-censored with some zeros in the series. In
regression (6), we look at the sub-sample of rich countries. The “correlation puzzle” remains.
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Equityij
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MarketCapij
0.88∗∗∗
(0.04)
1.03∗∗∗
(0.04)
1.04∗∗∗
(0.04)
1.26∗∗∗
(0.05)
1.06∗∗∗
(0.04)
0.99∗∗∗
(0.04)
Correlationij
7.36∗∗∗
(0.54)
3.29∗∗∗
(0.56)
2.86∗∗∗
(0.57)
1.72∗∗∗
(0.55)
2.95∗∗∗
(0.59)
2.57∗∗∗
(0.57)
Returnj
3.09∗∗
(1.60)
0.01
(1.37)
−0.16
(1.36)
−0.39
(1.20)
−0.79
(1.41)
2.60∗∗
(1.33)
GDP_CAPij
0.61∗∗∗
(0.07)
0.62∗∗∗
(0.07)
0.10
(0.08)
0.64∗∗
(0.07)
1.06∗∗∗
(0.15)
distij
−0.61∗∗∗
(0.10)
−0.49∗∗∗
(0.11)
−0.14
(0.12)
−0.45∗∗∗
(0.11)
−0.11
(0.10)
Borderij
−0.09
(0.33)
−0.15
(0.34)
0.23
(0.31)
−0.16
(0.35)
−0.10
(0.28)
Tradeij
0.22∗∗∗
(0.08)
0.20∗∗∗
(0.08)
0.53∗∗∗
(0.09)
0.24∗∗∗
(0.08)
0.24∗∗∗
(0.08)
CurrencyUnionij
0.62∗∗∗
(0.23)
0.55∗∗∗
(0.21)
0.64∗∗∗
(0.23)
0.94∗∗∗
(0.18)
LegalSystemij
0.27∗
(0.16)
0.26∗
(0.15)
0.29∗
(0.17)
0.13
(0.16)
Languageij
0.18
(0.17)
0.07
(0.18)
0.14
(0.18)
0.51∗∗∗
(0.16)
ColonialLinkij
0.33
(0.32)
0.24
(0.30)
0.36
(0.33)
0.07
(0.34)
FiscalTreatyij
0.30∗∗
(0.15)
0.08
(0.14)
0.31∗∗
(0.15)
−0.08
(0.14)
Estimation OLS OLS OLS FE Tobit OLS
R2 0.61 0.74 0.75 0.74 / 0.76
Number of Obs. 945 880 880 880 880 516
Table 1 : The Correlation Puzzle (Gravity Model for Equity Holdings)
Standard errors are in parenthesis. Statistical significance at the 1% level (resp. 5% and 10%) is
denoted by ∗∗∗(resp. ∗∗ and ∗).
Regression (6) is run on the sub-sample of rich countries (GDP per capita > 10 000$).
Regional dummies are always included but estimates are not reported.
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4 Solving the puzzle : instrumental variable estimates
4.1 An omitted variable bias
Are investors completely numb? Is it really the case that ceteris paribus they would choose to invest
in priority in foreign assets highly correlated with the main source of risk they are exposed to? We
argue that the puzzling positive relationship documented in the previous section could be driven by
the fact that the influence of the degree of market integration has not been entirely neutralized by
our control variables. By degree of financial integration, we mean the size of obstacles to foreign
equity holdings — regulations, informational asymetries, transaction costs, fiscal hindrances, or
other impediments, some of which are unobservable. If deeper integration leads simultaneously to
higher levels of cross-border equity holdings and to higher return comovements, the positive sign
of γ could just come from an omitted variable bias.
Returns correlations are endogenous indeed. The correlation eﬀect we have in mind appears
naturally in asset pricing models where returns dynamics are fully endogenized (see Dumas, Harvey
and Ruiz [2003], Cochrane et al. [2003], Bhamra [2002], Coeurdacier and Guibaud [2004]). In
these models, bilateral stock returns correlations are equilibrium outcomes that are aﬀected by
the degree of financial markets integration. The theoretical prediction is that as financial markets
integration rises, asset returns between countries are getting more synchronous. The intuition of
the mechanism that leads a higher level of integration to induce a higher level of stock return
correlations (for a given level of correlation of the "fundamentals") is easy to catch. Take the
case of two countries and two assets, one in each country, with imperfectly correlated dividends
and consider the impact on asset prices of a good shock on domestic dividends. If both markets
are completely segmented, this good shock on the domestic asset will drive its price up without
aﬀecting the foreign asset price. Now, if both markets are perfectly integrated, the increase in
the domestic asset price will lead the investor to rebalance part of her portfolio towards the
foreign asset — because her exposure to domestic risk has increased with the increase in the
13
domestic asset price. The required rate of return on the foreign asset decreases (because its
diversification property are now more cherished) and the foreign asset price must increase to
restore equilibrium. This rebalancing eﬀect naturally leads to more comovement between domestic
and foreign asset prices than in the fully-segmented world. The impact of the level of financial
integration on returns correlations has been established empirically by Bekaert and Harvey [2000]:
for a sample of emerging economies, they found that equity market liberalization increases stock
markets comovement of countries with the rest of the world. Looking at stock returns correlation
between countries over 150 years, Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst [2002] find that the correlation
vary considerably through time and is significantly higher during periods of financial integration.
Because we cannot really capture the degree of integration (to be understood as the size of
all obstacles to bilateral equity holdings), we cannot perfectly control for this variable in the
regression, which leads our estimate to be biased upward. We show in the appendix that it is
possible that this missing variable bias switches the sign of the impact of stock market correlation
on equity holdings. To get rid of this endogeneity bias, we need to use an instrumental variable
for the stock market correlation.
4.2 Instrumental variables methodology
We propose to instrument the stock market correlation in the nineties by its value over the period
1950-1975. We construct historical correlations in USD (Correlation50-75ij) using monthly stock
market data over the period 1950-1975 for our sample of countries. We argue that it provides a
good instrument for two reasons. First, a large part of recent correlations is explained by past
correlations. This is not surprising as we can expect fundamental comovements to be persistent.
The first-stage regression (Correlationij = α + β Correlation50-75ij + εij) performs very well
(the T -stat for β is equal to 12.53 and the R-square of the regression is 0.15). Second, the
observed correlation before the mid-1970’s reflects much more the fundamentals than nowadays
since financial markets were highly segmented in the fifties-sixties (see figure (1) in appendix,
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taken from Obstfeld and Taylor [2002]). Stock market liberalization occurred in the eighties for
most countries (for precise timing, see Kaminsky and Schmuckler [2003]). Before, cross-border
shareholdings were very marginal and international asset trade was mainly borrowing and lending
(Kraay and Ventura [2000]). For a sample of OECD countries, Lane and Milesi-Ferreti [2003] show
that even at the beginning of the 1980’s, aggregate cross-border equity and FDI assets represented
only 10% of aggregate GDP. In 2000, this ratio had jumped to 80%. Our computed historical
correlation constitute a “good” instrument as this variable is all at once a powerful predictor of
the actual correlation and exogeneous to the degree of market integration.
4.3 Instrumental variable estimation
Table (2) shows our estimation results with the instrumented correlation and the same set of
control variables as before. The results are remarkable : first, when we do not control for geography
and trade, the puzzle does not disappear. Second, once control variables are included, we find that
the correlation has a negative impact on the demand for foreign stocks. This result is robust at
reasonable level of significance in all regressions12 . The “correlation puzzle” vanishes: investors
do not behave exactly opposite to the recommendations of portfolio choice theory.
The fact that the estimate of the impact of correlation switches from positive to negative, i.e.
the fact that the bias when we do not control for endogeneity is large enough to overturn the sign
of the point estimate, is consistent with the fact that theoretical papers have found the positive
impact of market integration on return correlation to be rather small (this shows up in the role
of coeﬃcient λ in the "Omitted variable bias" appendix).
12 Only the estimate with source country fixed-eﬀect is not significant at the 1% level (it is significant at a 10%
level).
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Equityij
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MarketCapij
1.02∗∗∗
(0.04)
1.09∗∗∗
(0.04)
1.09∗∗∗
(0.04)
1.24∗∗∗
(0.05)
1.10∗∗∗
(0.04)
IV-Correlationij
1.86
(1.47)
−5.13∗∗∗
(1.18)
−4.47∗∗∗
(1.20)
−3.55∗∗∗
(1.14)
−4.61∗∗∗
(1.21)
Returnj
5.16∗∗∗
(1.94)
5.73∗∗∗
(1.49)
5.55∗∗∗
(1.47)
3.89∗∗∗
(1.31)
5.58∗∗∗
(1.49)
GDP_CAPij
0.96∗∗∗
(0.08)
0.97∗∗∗
(0.08)
0.23∗∗
(0.10)
0.97∗∗∗
(0.08)
distij
−0.72∗∗∗
(0.10)
−0.56∗∗∗
(0.11)
−0.34∗∗∗
(0.11)
−0.56∗∗∗
(0.11)
Borderij
0.01
(0.33)
−0.13
(0.34)
0.17
(0.30)
−0.14
(0.35)
Tradeij
0.39∗∗∗
(0.08)
0.33∗∗∗
(0.08)
0.46∗∗∗
(0.09)
0.35∗∗∗
(0.08)
CurrencyUnionij
0.71∗∗∗
(0.22)
0.57∗∗∗
(0.21)
0.72∗∗∗
(0.22)
LegalSystemij
0.31∗
(0.16)
0.32∗∗
(0.14)
0.32∗∗
(0.16)
Languageij
0.25
(0.17)
0.13
(0.17)
0.24
(0.17)
ColonialLinkij
0.32
(0.32)
0.08
(0.30)
0.31
(0.32)
FiscalTreatyij
0.29∗
(0.15)
0.10
(0.14)
0.30∗∗
(0.15)
Estimation OLS OLS OLS FE Tobit
R2 0.48 0.72 0.75 0.71 /
Number of Obs. 848 788 788 788 788
Table 2 : Gravity Model for Equity Holdings using Instrumented Stock Return Correlation
Standard errors are in parenthesis. Statistical significance at the 1% level (resp. 5% and 10%) is
denoted by ∗∗∗(resp. ∗∗ and ∗).
Correlationij is instrumented according to the following first-stage regression :
Correlationij = α+ β Correlation50-75ij + εij
β is significant at the 1% level (T-Stat=12.53). First-stage regression is not shown but available on
request.
Regional dummies are always included but estimates are not reported.
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4.4 Robustness checks
Correlation transformation: it might be argued that due to the fact that correlations take value
over the bounded interval [−1, 1], error terms are not normally distributed. We checked for this
concern by using log((1 + correl)/(1− correl)) in our regressions, as suggested in Otto, Voss and
Willard [2001]. Our results were not aﬀected.
“Rich” Countries Sample: we checked the robustness of our results by restricting our sample
to “rich” countries. Countries in this sub-sample have a GDP per capita higher than 10 000 USD
(the cut-oﬀ country is Greece). Data for those countries are probably more accurate. All our
results are confirmed qualitatively and quantitatively (table 3 below).
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Equityij
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MarketCapij
0.87∗∗∗
(0.04)
1.05∗∗∗
(0.04)
1.05∗∗∗
(0.04)
1.17∗∗∗
(0.04)
IV-Correlationij
6.03
(1.59)
−3.90∗∗
(1.79)
−3.54∗∗
(1.74)
−4.23∗∗∗
(1.64)
Returnj
7.44∗∗∗
(1.95)
3.76∗∗∗
(1.26)
3.27∗∗∗
(1.25)
3.86∗∗∗
(1.09)
GDP_CAPij
0.77∗∗∗
(0.17)
1.07∗∗∗
(0.17)
0.47∗∗∗
(0.19)
distij
−0.44∗∗∗
(0.08)
−0.22∗∗
(0.09)
−0.28∗∗∗
(0.09)
Borderij
0.09
(0.28)
−0.03
(0.29)
0.09
(0.25)
Tradeij
0.45∗∗∗
(0.08)
0.44∗∗∗
(0.08)
0.46∗∗∗
(0.08)
CurrencyUnionij
0.97∗∗∗
(0.18)
1.15∗∗∗
(0.17)
LegalSystemij
0.14
(0.17)
−0.05
(0.15)
Languageij
0.32∗∗
(0.16)
−0.06
(0.15)
ColonialLinkij
0.01
(0.35)
0.12
(0.32)
FiscalTreatyij
0.09
(0.14)
0.01
(0.13)
Estimation OLS OLS OLS FE
R2 0.53 0.72 0.74 0.73
Number of Obs. 541 516 516 516
Table 3 : Gravity Model for Equity Holdings using Instrumented Stock Return Correlation
(Rich Countries Sample)
Standard errors are in parenthesis. Statistical significance at the 1% level (resp. 5% and 10%) is
denoted by ∗∗∗ (resp. ∗∗ and ∗).
Correlationij is instrumented according to the following first-stage regression :
Correlationij = α+ β Correlation50-75ij + εij
β is significant at the 1% level . First-stage regression is not shown but available on request.
Regional dummies are always included but estimates are not reported.
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5 Conclusion
Under realistic assumptions, foreign assets that provide good hedge for domestic risk should be
more attractive to domestic investors: if investors hold “home-biased” portfolios, they should tilt
their foreign holdings towards assets that have low return correlation with the domestic ones.
In this paper, we proposed to test this simple hypothesis in a “gravity equation” setup using
aggregate data on bilateral equity holdings.
Running OLS regressions of bilateral correlation of stock returns on bilateral equity holdings we
found that asset holdings increase with the correlation of stock returns between countries, at odds
with what theory predicts. We then showed that this “puzzle” vanishes when the endogeneity of
returns correlation is properly taken into account. The point is that the correlation of asset returns
is itself an equilibrium outcome — which is aﬀected by the degree of financial market integration:
an increasing degree of market integration leads to higher comovements of stock returns. To find
a source of variations in current return correlations that is exogenous to the degree of market
integration, we used bilateral stock return correlation over the period 1950-1975: before the mid
1970’s, markets were highly segmented and the observed correlation was purely reflecting the
“fundamentals”. This instrumentation scheme allowed us to recover asset demand functions that
decrease with returns correlation.
Our finding that diversification actually matters for international portfolio choice is somewhat
dissonant compared to what people have come to believe. Our work restores some credit for
the empirical validity of portfolio choice theory at an international level: even though they can
exhibit bounded rationality, over-confidence and a naive approach to diversification, investors are
not completely heedless to the basic logic of the textbook mean-variance model of portfolio choice.
Acknowledging that assets returns correlation — i.e. assets “substituability” — is endogenous
was crucial in getting our final result. Beyond the context of this paper, we believe more theoretical
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and empirical work remains to be done on the determinants of financial markets comovements.
Since the early 1970’s, the correlation between US monthly stock returns (S&P500) and a synthetic
non-US world index has increased by 0.1 each decade, rising continuously from 0.4 in 1970 to 0.71
in 200013 . To our knowledge, there exists no compelling explanation for this huge rise in stock
markets “synchronization”. One such explanation is very much required.
13 In August 2004, the correlation (computed on a 5-year window) had risen up to 0.82.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of proposition 2
In the case without frictions, we have
Ω


α0H
α0F

 =
1
γ


RH
RF


Besides, by definition of Ω,
Ω


α0H
α0F

 =


σ2H ωT
ω ΩF




α0H
α0F

 =


σ2Hα0H + ωTα0F
α0Hω +ΩFα0F


Then, concentrating on the bottom part of the first equation, we get
1
γ
RF = α0Hω +ΩFα0F
Substituting for 1γRF in αF = Ω
−1
F
h
1
γRF − αHω
i
yields:
αF = Ω−1F
·
1
γ
RF − αHω
¸
= α0F − (αH − α0H)Ω−1F ω
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6.2 Data sources
• Bilateral Exports and Imports: in 2001, in US Dollars from the CHELEM dataset
(Centres d’Etudes Propectives et d’Informations Internationales, CEPII, Paris).
• Bilateral Equity Holdings: in US dollars, in 2001, from the Coordinated Portfolio Invest-
ment Survey, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm. When equity holdings
are “very small” (the smallest value reported is 10 000$), the dataset reports a zero. We
consider those zeros to be equal to 0.01 million USD (except in the Tobit estimation).
• GDP and GDP/capita : from the International Financial Statistics.(GDP in US dollars
in 2001, exchange rates used are also from the IFS).
• Geography Variables: in km, from S—J Wei’s website and from various sources (“How far
is it ?”, http://www.indo.com/distance )
• Common Language and Colonial Link: various sources (for colonial link, mainly sum-
maries of country history in Encyclopedias.)
• Legal Variable: mainly La Porta et al. [1998], various sources for missing countries 14 .
• Tax Treaty Variable: IBFD online products (http://www.ibfd.org); Latin American Tax-
ation Database, European Taxation Database, Asia—Pacific Taxation Database, Tax Treaties
Database.
• Stock Market Returns: monthly end-of-period data from 1950 to 2001 in Local Currency
from Global Financial Data. Converted in USD using end-of period Exchange Rate from the
same dataset.
14 http://www.llrx.com
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6.3 Geographical sample
Source Countries
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, Malaysia,
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal,
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States
Destination Countries
Europe:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland,United Kingdom
Israel, Turkey
Asia & Oceania:
Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia,
Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines,
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand
North America:
Canada, United States
Central & South America:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru
Africa:
Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa
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6.4 Descriptive statistics
All variables are expressed in log (except stock market correlations)
Mean Std Min Max N
Equityij 5.00 3.64 -4.605 12.76 945
Tradeij -18.80 1.22 -22.34 -13.46444 1014
MarketCapij 23.90 2.11 18.78 30.85 1080
log(Distanceij) 8.55 1.04 5.25 9.89 1080
Correlationij 0.393 0.187 -0.135 0.875 1080
Correlation50-75ij 0.166 0.155 -0.208 0.961 945
Returnj 0.048 0.062 -0.078 0.215 41
GDP-CAPij 19.01 1.37 13.69 21.03 1080
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6.5 Omitted Variable Bias
Let us note Iij the degree of market integration between the two markets. Then we can write the
following system of equations:
Equityij = α− γCorrelationij + δIij + ηZ1ij + εeij
Correlationij = θ + λIij + εcij
where γ, δ, λ are expected to be strictly positive, εeij and εcij are uncorrelated and normally
distributed with zero mean and respective variance σ2e and σ2c , and Z1ij is a set of control variables
(including market sizes, distance, etc.). For simplicity, we suppose Z1ij is orthogonal to the other
explaining variables.
In section 3, we estimated the following equation
Equityij = α− γˆCorrelationij + ηˆZ1ij + ζij
where ζij is normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2ζ . According to the true model,
we estimated :
Equityij = α− γCorrelationij + δ
·
Correlationij − θ + εcij
λ
¸
+ ηZ1ij + εeij
= α− δθ
λ
−
·
γ − δ
λ
¸
Correlationij + ηZ1ij + εeij −
δεcij
λ
Hence:
E [γˆ] = γ − δ
λ
Since δλ > 0, our estimator is biased — the correlation variable is spuriously catching the eﬀect of
market integration on equity holdings. If δλ > γ, a positive relationship between Correlationij and
Equityij is to be expected, consistently with our estimations in section 3.
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How plausible is the switch in the sign of the correlation variable?
The condition for the bias to be large enough is δλ > γ. This happens if the impact of
market integration on equity holdings (characterized by δ) is large relative to the impact of market
integration on stock returns correlation (characterized by λ).
In a companion paper (Coeurdacier and Guibaud [2004]), we show that the degree of market
integration has a first-order eﬀect on bilateral equity holdings but is aﬀecting stock returns cor-
relation only to a second-order. This is consistent with the switch in the sign of the correlation
variable that we get in section 4.
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Figure 1: A Stylized View of Capital Mobility (Obstfeld and Taylor, [2002])
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